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Abstract 
 
A new emerging paradigm of Uncertain Risk of Suspi- 
cion, Threat and Danger, observed across the field of in- 
formation security, is described.  Based on this paradigm 
a novel approach to anomaly detection is presented.  Our 
approach is based on a simple yet powerful analogy from 
the innate part of the human immune system, the Toll-Like 
Receptors.  We argue that such receptors incorporated as 
part of an anomaly detector enhance the detector’s ability 
to distinguish normal and anomalous behaviour.  In addi- 
tion we propose that Toll-Like Receptors enable the classi- 
fication of detected anomalies based on the types of attacks 
that perpetrate the anomalous behaviour. Classification of 
such type is either missing in existing literature or is not fit 
for the purpose of reducing the burden of an administrator 
of an intrusion detection system. For our model to work, we 
propose the creation of a taxonomy of the digital Acytota, 
based on which our receptors are created. 
 
 
 
1 The State of Affairs 
 
Signature and anomaly based intrusion detection sys- 
tems (IDS) have been around for many years, yet repeat- 
edly have encountered the same pitfalls over and over again. 
This issue has been raised in the past, notably by Gates and 
Taylor [4] who challenged the idea of network based ano- 
maly detection systems. Gates’ and Taylor’s account of the 
problem focuses mainly on anomaly detection in the net- 
work environment, however the area of host based intru- 
sion detection, be it signature or anomaly based, exhibit 
analogous issues.  Systems which combine these two ap- 
proaches are sparse, let alone successful at attracting the 
security community to pursue the mixed approach further. 
We argue that such approach has so far been unsuccessful 
due to the way the fusion of the approaches was tackled. 
One of the most counter-productive failings of existing 
IDS systems is the enduring presence of false positive alerts. 
This problem is aggravated even more with the sheer vol- 
ume of such alerts. In anomaly based detection systems this 
is often due to the lack of re-training and re-calibration of 
detectors especially in unstable environments.  These high 
volumes result in the difficulty of analysing logs produced 
by intrusion detection systems.  Various forms of visuali- 
sation exist that attempt to solve this issue, however with 
little success [11]. Gates and Taylor [4] propose a classifi- 
cation of detected anomalies based on the type of attack that 
caused them in order for an IDS administrator to be able to 
prioritise and deal with most serious threats first. We pro- 
pose that the incorporation of our immunological analogy 
enables anomaly classification at a level suitable for such 
prioritisation. 
A seemingly simple part of the innate immune system 
that only recently began its research journey by immunol- 
ogists has been our vital inspiration.  This is the area of 
Pathogen Associated Molecular Patterns (PAMP) and Toll 
Like Receptors (TLR) in particular [3].  After some study 
of the security field, the authors realised that numerous re- 
searchers have presented ideas that support our proposed 
model, or that add functionality to form a more coherent 
whole outlining a paradigm worth investigating.  We call 
this paradigm UR-STD. 
 
 
2 The Uncertain Risk of STD 
 
 
In 1994 Polly Matzinger shook the world of immunology 
with her controversial model of how the immune system op- 
erates [7]. Her view divided the immunological community 
which until this day segregates itself into classical immunol- 
ogy, the Danger model and immunologists who don’t clas- 
sify themselves into any of the aforementioned camps.  In 
Matzinger’s model, danger is defined as follows [7]: 
 
• Danger - the total damage to cells indicated by distress 
signals that are sent out when cells die an unnatural 
death 
The authors cannot determine if the shift in immunology 
from a concrete deterministic concept of self/non-self to a 
less concrete danger model had an effect on the thinking 
within the field of computer science, however a brief scan 
through research into new paradigms reveals a number of 
related approaches to computer security. Hollebeek’s paper 
[5] on the role of suspicion in model based IDS gives a fas- 
cinating account of two new concepts of suspicion and un- 
certainty. These are introduced as part of a forensic anal- 
ysis model that employs such new ways of thinking about 
what could constitute malicious behaviour in post-analysis. 
His definitions are as follows [5]: 
 
• Suspicion - likelihood that a given event or pattern of 
events is evidence of malicious behaviour 
 
• Uncertainty - likelihood that deductions are correct 
and the likelihood the observed behaviour is normal 
under the assumption that no malicious behaviour is 
present 
 
A number of points from Hollebeek’s work are comple- 
menting the thesis of this paper. Firstly the fact that in foren- 
sic analysis an analyst only needs a few clues in order to 
recognise an intrusion.  This approach works well from a 
forensics point of view rather than anomaly detection, how- 
ever as will be shown in Section 6.2, this does not have to 
be the case. Secondly a concept which is paramount to the 
Danger model by Matzinger, the notion of context, as be- 
ing a vital part of an IDS. Hollebeek does not associate his 
views with immunology or the Danger model. The assump- 
tion therefore might be that an investigation of Matzinger’s 
model might provide some additional inspiration, which can 
teach us something applicable to IDS. 
Besides the already mentioned new metrics,  Saydjari 
proposed a new measure for system security, Risk [13]. An- 
other term, originally classified more as a subjective mea- 
sure, nevertheless presented by Saydjari with all the quali- 
ties of a good metric. His definition is as follows [13]: 
 
• Risk - risk of an event happening is the probability of 
that event happening multiplied by the consequences 
(damage or loss) from that event 
 
• Overall Risk - the sum of the risk of all the bad 
events(failures) that can be induced by a malicious at- 
tacker on an information system 
 
Last but not least the term threat, which has been used 
in information security for decades, only now beginning to 
stand as a valid measure in its own right.  Sahinoglu for 
example defines threat in his model in the following way 
[12]: 
 
• Threat - the probability of the exploitation of some 
vulnerability or weakness within a specific time frame. 
We propose that a new paradigm is emerging in exist- 
ing literature. This paradigm moves away from traditional 
forms of measures from quantifiably objective to seemingly 
more subjective ones.  We call this the Uncertain Risk of 
Suspicion, Threat and Danger paradigm. 
In the remainder of our paper we will present a new ap- 
proach to intrusion detection closely tied to the newly de- 
fined UR-STD paradigm, particularly to the notion of dan- 
ger, based on Matzinger’s model, suspicion by Hollebeek 
and a more general notion of threat. 
 
3 PAMPing up Anomaly Detection 
 
As proposed by Matzinger’s model and many subsequent 
research works undertaken by immunologists, pathogen as- 
sociated molecular patterns and their detectors play a vital 
role in detecting danger in the human body. One such type 
of PAMP detectors are Toll-Like Receptors which are de- 
scribed in more detail in Section 4.  This paper proposes 
that PAMP receptors are a necessary extension to current 
anomaly detection techniques in order to obtain results from 
our systems that go beyond what has been achieved in both 
anomaly and signature based detection fields.  Hollebeek 
[5] confirms this view, arguing that in forensics, an analyst 
does not analyse data in a naive way. In other words he can- 
not analyse data without knowing about what he is looking 
for.  We suggest that receptors, such as TLRs are missing. 
As John McHugh stated in his work on locality, the under- 
standing of our systems with which we work is necessary to 
the degree, which will allow us to identify necessary parts of 
malicious activities [9]. Surprisingly McHugh’s intentions 
portray the functionality of TLRs in the human immune sys- 
tem very well. 
 
3.1 Signatures  and Anomalies 
 
Gates’ provocative discussion on the anomaly detection 
paradigm in the networking environment [4] points out a 
number of disparities between Denning’s seminal paper on 
anomaly detection [2] and the way her model is used by 
many security researchers. Anomaly based detection is not 
performing as we would like and thus we could assume 
either that its concept is applied incorrectly, it is missing 
something or both. Anomaly detection is missing that little 
extra knowledge that forensic analysts have in mind when 
looking for clues in data logs or when Agatha Christie’s 
famous Belgian detective Poirot is solving a murder mys- 
tery.  This missing knowledge is what Hollebeek wonder- 
fully termed as ‘smelling the rat’ without a ‘smoking gun’ 
[5]. In our proposed model anomalous behaviour is not ma- 
licious.  We suggest that malicious behaviour exhibits cer- 
tain features, analogous to biological malignant objects, that 
it cannot occur without, much like viruses/bacteria. This is 
especially true when diversity is a factor in terms of ob- 
served attributes of a system. Such unique features are the 
extra knowledge that we need in order to distinguish be- 
tween anomalous and malicious behaviour.  TLRs are the 
proposed way of storing and sensing such features when 
they occur.  In order to obtain the necessary information 
about such features we propose the creation of a taxonomy 
of the digital Acytota as described in Section 5. 
 
4 Toll-Like Receptors 
 
Paramount to our model is the notion of lower level, low 
volume receptors, which detect by-products of malicious 
activity. Such receptors exist in the human body in the form 
of Toll-Like Receptors. In the following section we will in- 
troduce these structures and draw an analogy to computer 
security. 
 
4.1 Function 
 
Toll-like receptors are a set of receptors on the surface 
of immune cells, which act as sensors to foreign microbial 
products, more broadly described as PAMPs.  Up to this 
date around twelve TLRs have been discovered in the hu- 
man body, each of them sensing a specific protein or a set 
of proteins discharged by viruses and bacteria.  These mi- 
crobial products are of essential nature to the existence and 
function of the foreign entities, thus making it impossible 
for the bacteria and viruses to adapt and evade these recep- 
tors. A simple definition of TLRs is that they are the initial 
line of defence against pathogens attacking a system. They 
sound an alarm when they encounter certain virus or bac- 
teria specific chemicals, which trigger a cascade of events 
potentially resulting in an immune response. One can think 
of these receptors as piano keys. A different sound is played 
when a different key or combination of keys is pressed at 
once.  TLRs can be categorised based on their specializa- 
tion. TLRs 1,2,4,5 and 6 mainly specialise in bacterial prod- 
ucts, whereas TLRs 3,7,8 and 9 specialise in the detection 
of virus specific by-products and nucleic acids. This func- 
tionality of TLRs is a feature which is in many ways anal- 
ogous to some problems computer security.  The fact that 
different combinations of activated TLRs perform different 
actions make it possible for the idea to be used in a multi- 
dimensional environment such as intrusion detection. 
 
4.2 Analogy 
 
From the description of the functionality of TLRs, one 
can see that such receptors lend themselves to the missing 
component of anomaly detection. This is due to their sim- 
plicity yet powerful functionality. One can argue that in the 
human body TLRs detect ligands which are produced by 
parts of malignant entities which are not subject to muta- 
tion. This is very different from the nature of digital mali- 
cious entities which can mutate or morph between versions 
or even on their own (e.g.  polymorphic virus).  However 
we argue that due to the deterministic nature of machines 
the creation of a taxonomy of the digital Acytota should be 
possible, which at some level is representative of the mali- 
cious entities digital systems encounter. Such a taxonomy 
will have to evolve over time at some level, however this 
will be incomparable in terms of frequency and volume to 
the level at which current signature based systems are up- 
dated. 
To enforce our argument for TLRs as the correct candi- 
date for our analogy, we look back at Hollebeek’s work. In 
his paper, an overall suspicion in his model is described as 
‘a function of the degree to which each resource, event, or 
inference is suspicious and the number of independent rea- 
sons we have for being suspicious of it’ [5].  Here we can 
see a clear parallel with the functionality of TLRs.  Given 
that each resource, event and possibly an inference holds a 
set of TLRs, we can obtain a measure of suspicion, which 
together with existing anomaly based systems can give us a 
more decisive view of what is happening. 
 
5 Towards a Taxonomy of the Digital Acytota 
 
In order to be able to employ the functionality of TLRs 
in intrusion detection systems, we need to develop a taxon- 
omy of the digital malicious world. This is a pre-requisite, 
without which the proposed model becomes less effective. 
Such a taxonomy would not only allow us to implement the 
notion of TLRs fully, but would also allow us to classify 
detected malicious activities based on their type. One exist- 
ing analysis of system calls in terms of their threat level and 
class of possible malicious activity has been proposed by 
Bernaschi in [1]. He classified system calls into four differ- 
ent threat levels, based on what kind of attack they are most 
likely to be used for, and nine groups of system function- 
ality.  For example Bernaschi classified system calls open, 
mount and link, among others, as belonging to threat level 
group 1, which represents system calls generally used for 
attacks that allow for the full control of a system. 
Examination of various other components, levels and ab- 
stractions within computer systems is desirable in order to 
obtain a more complete picture of the TLR like features that 
are exhibited by malicious entities. We can start by exam- 
ining existing works of research, followed by our own anal- 
ysis of the digital Acytota. In current literature we can find 
work which contains some useful information from this per- 
spective. For example McHugh’s [9] work on locality con- 
tains description of features that are present in locality in- 
formation unique to certain types of malicious network ac- 
tivities. McHugh uses the aggressive network behaviour of 
 a Code Red or SQL/Slammer as an example, which corre- 
sponds to our desired, seemingly unique features. Another 
candidate is the set of system call arguments. These exhibit 
numerous features which can be considered unique to at- 
tacks. We can also clearly define what types of system call 
arguments can present a higher risk to a system. For exam- 
ple an argument which contains the reference to the passwd 
file under the Unix OS can be potentially much more haz- 
ardous than a reference to a word processing document in 
a user’s home directory. The inclusion of system call argu- 
ments in our TLR model should also ensure the detection of 
mimicry attacks. 
 
6 Proof of Concept 
 
In order to evaluate our model, we have developed a sys- 
tem which incorporates the afore-described model.   This 
system was constructed by observing the human immune 
system and while maintaining some aspects of the biologi- 
cal functionality, the immune system was largely an inspira- 
tion rather than a guide. For the anomaly detector which in- 
corporates TLRs, Kohonen’s Self-Organising Maps (SOM) 
[6] have been used, due to their similarity to the role of tis- 
sue in the human body. Further justifications for the use of 
SOMs are described in the following section. 
 
6.1 SOMs as  a Somatic model 
 
The idea of self-organising networks comes as an ideal 
analogy to an environment within which TLRs exist in the 
human body, tissue. This is based on their similar behaviour 
and functionality. Both self-organising networks and tissue 
have nodes/cells, which dynamically change based on the 
situation they are in. SOM networks adapt to data which is 
passed through them and in human tissue, cells die and new 
ones are created as the body needs them. 
One such type of self-organising networks are the afore- 
mentioned Kohonen’s self-organising maps (SOM) [6]. Ko- 
honen’s SOM is an algorithm which allows the input of 
highly multi-dimensional data which is reduced to a pre- 
defined smaller dimensionality in order to represent such 
complex data in a more understandable manner for both 
human and machine.  It organises the input data within a 
low-dimensional map, based on the similarity between the 
incoming data items and items already present in the map. 
In this way, the algorithm automatically organises and puts 
similar data items in topologically close proximity of each 
other within the generated map. 
This self-organisation presents a number of parallels be- 
tween the digital and a biological system.  Such as the fa- 
cilitation of a possible localisation function based on the 
topological proximity of neighbouring nodes within a SOM 
[10], possibly of interest to the research on locality [9]. 
 
 
Figure 1. TLR implementation within a SOM 
 
 
The ability of self-organising network algorithms such 
as Kohonen’s SOM allow us to experiment and take into 
account the issues of diversity [8] with little difficulty. As 
will be shown in Section 6.3, the ability to monitor a large 
variety as well as only few aspects of the monitored system, 
provide an ideal environment for TLR implementation. 
 
6.2 Implementation  of TLRs 
 
In our system, the implementation of TLRs is achieved 
by the creation of a table structure for every node within a 
SOM. We have taken Bernaschi’s [1] system call threat level 
categorisation and experimented with threat level 1 group. 
This means system calls used in attacks which allow for the 
full control of a system.  These 23 system calls are used 
in our model as one TLR, which each SOM node exhibits. 
Figure 1 shows the TLR model within the SOM context. 
Kohonen’s SOM algorithm, just like any other unsuper- 
vised learning algorithm, comprises of two steps. Training 
and detection. The role of TLRs in training is different from 
detection. The SOM, besides being trained on various sys- 
tem signals described below, learns the PAMPs encountered 
during training. In our implementations PAMPs are simply 
system calls which have been called during a time frame 
that is represented by an incoming node (data vector). The 
algorithm initially starts with random values assigned to the 
maps node’s weight values, as proposed by Kohonen. The 
TLR data structure, as seen in Figure 1, is initialised for 
each node within the SOM map with a value for the Trig- 
gered field as 0, meaning false.  During training the map 
learns according to the standard SOM algorithm, with the 
additional functionality of activation of TLRs when relevant 
PAMPs are encountered.  This activation occurs when in- 
coming nodes on which the SOM is trained present PAMPs 
which the SOM node’s TLRs bind to. 
Incoming nodes into the SOM are our input feature vec- 
tors (IFVs).  These comprise of the monitored features of 
the system in question. In our experimental setup, the IFVs 
constitute of 14 different process specific measures, such 
as CPU usage, memory usage and other host based met- 
rics.  For more information regarding the data used in our 
experiment see Section 6.3.1. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
PAMPs presented by IFVs are stored in a similar data struc- 
ture as TLRs on nodes within the SOM. Once the SOM al- 
gorithm determines the winning node for the currently ob- 
served IFV, we simply trigger its TLRs depending on the 
presented PAMPs.  This way we train our SOM not only 
on the IFV data but also on the specific features that are 
observable during normal operation of the monitored sys- 
tem/resource (i.e. a monitored process in our case). Once 
our SOM is trained, this represents a reduced representation 
of normal behaviour of the monitored system/resource. 
In the detection stage, rather than adjusting the SOM 
map further, we simply find the Best Matching Unit (BMU) 
for the currently presented IFV and calculate their simi- 
larity.  At the same time our system monitors if the cur- 
rently observed IFV presents a PAMP. If it does, then the 
algorithm checks which TLRs of the BMU have been trig- 
gered during training.  If the IFV presents PAMPs which 
were present during training, than we assume that their pres- 
ence is justified, thus nothing additional happens. We might 
however retain the information holding the total number of 
triggered TLRs which were encountered during training for 
purposes yet to be investigated (e.g.  SOM evolution). On 
the other hand if PAMPs are encountered which have not 
been detected during training, then our TLR activation level 
increases.  This activation level is a measure of suspicious 
activity on its own, however we can use it to amend the 
result of the overall BMU distance measure, which is a rep- 
resentation of how anomalous a monitored IFV is.  Thus 
making an IFV which presents a large number of PAMPs, 
not encountered during training, more anomalous and suspi- 
cious than an IFV which does not present any PAMPs. The 
effect of this action is to be further investigated and tested 
to fully appreciate its possibilities and correctness. 
Using this model we argue that we are able to achieve 
what Hollebeek [5] proposed in his paper for forensics anal- 
ysis. Yet we are looking to achieve this for real-time IDS. 
His point of view that an analyst only needs a few clues 
to recognise an intrusion becomes viable with the use of 
TLR’s. Incompleteness as a necessary characteristic of the 
model is also pertinent in our case. 
We further argue that the diversity of IFV’s with the ad- 
dition of TLR’s offers a view of a context within which ma- 
licious activities are detected, which inevitably is a vital part 
of an IDS [5]. This leads onto another vital capability of our 
system, which has not been implemented as of yet, however 
it is expected to be realised in the foreseeable future. This is 
the ability to classify detected anomalies based on the type 
of attack that most likely caused them.  In our model this 
is to be implemented by assigning individual TLRs to a set 
of features which, as defined in our taxonomy of Acytota, 
represent a certain class of attacks.  For example a recep- 
tor called TLR1 will detect any PAMPs that are associated 
with denial of service attacks. For such attacks we already 
have a set of commonly used system calls as suggested by 
Bernaschi [1].  Other unique features that could belong to 
this receptor are for example specific types of IRC com- 
munication sequences exhibited by bots.  Once our model 
contains a set of TLRs, each representing a class of attacks, 
we can incorporate various metrics from our UR-STD pa- 
radigm.  For example we can define a measure of uncer- 
tainty, which depends on the proportion of activated TLRs 
and the total TLR activation level per SOM node. This will 
then provide us with a level of confidence showing to what 
degree a detected anomaly belongs to the chosen class of 
attacks.  The choice of what class an anomaly belongs to 
is determined based on which TLR had the highest activa- 
tion level. Additionally the calculation of risk of a particu- 
lar type of anomaly, based on its classification is a possible 
candidate for further investigation. 
The role of suspicion in our model is another metrics 
that can be used to make assumptions about the overall be- 
haviour of the monitored system. For example we use it to 
denote the total number of IFVs which present at least one 
PAMP to the SOM which has not been encountered during 
training. Thus we can obtain a measure of how suspicious a 
session or a window of events is. This measure is described 
in Section 6.3.3. 
 
6.3 Experimental  Design 
 
As mentioned previously, our experimental setup is 
mainly for illustrative purposes.   It is yet to be statisti- 
cally validated and further explored, however it provides a 
demonstration of our proposed TLR model with some ini- 
tial results. 
 
6.3.1   Data 
 
We have tested our model on a set of real data, based on the 
work of Twycross [14]. The data comprises of 55 sessions 
of normal behaviour and 5 attack sessions (4 sessions of a 
wuftpd vulnerability exploit and 1 nmap scan session). The 
session logs were generated using a process monitor, which 
samples various process specific information at a regular in- 
terval and system call information generated by the standard 
Unix tool called strace. A total number of 14 features have 
been observed using process monitor at any point in time, 
giving us a diverse coverage of the monitored system. For 
more information regarding the dataset please refer to [14]. 
 
6.3.2   SOM parameters 
 
A large number of parameters exists as part of the standard 
Kohonen’s SOM algorithm. For our system we have chosen 
a set of parameters which have been statistically shown to 
be appropriate for a scenario such as our. These can be seen 
in Table 1. These parameters are a vital part of the anomaly 
detector and thus their thorough examination is a topic of 
future research. 
 
Table 1. SOM parameters 
Parameter Value 
SOM Size 15 
Iterations 4 
Initial Learning Rate 0.9 
Neighbourhood Function squared 
Neighbourhood Size 15/2 
 
 
One parameter which is used in our system that does not 
conform to the basic SOM algorithm is the use of a distance 
metrics other than Euclidean.  A normalisation percentage 
metrics is used due to the fact that the data used in our ex- 
periments is not normalised at the pre-processing stage. The 
formula used for calculating this BMU % distance measure 
is shown below: 
M 
M n((MM ,IF V V )/(M ax(MM ,IF V V )/100) 
N o.of Dnme(sno(s 
 
This measure gives us a clearer indication of the similar- 
ity between the tested IFVs and the trained SOM. 
The system calls used as TLRs in our model are as fol- 
lows: open, link, unlink, chmod, lchown, rename, fchown, 
chown, mknod, mount, symlink, fchmod, execve, setgid, se- 
treuid, setregid, setgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, setresuid, se- 
tresgid, setuid, init module. As stated earlier they are threat 
level 1 group from Bernaschi’s work [1]. 
The SOM was trained on 7 normal sessions, chosen at 
random from the existing 55 sessions. The sessions used for 
training are as follows: 2, 10, 14, 24, 35, 41, 57. Following 
the training session, the SOM was tested against a subset of 
the normal sessions not used during training and against all 
attack sessions. 
 
 
6.3.3   Results 
 
Our initial experiments have produced the following 
promising results. In Figure 2 we can see the result of the 
BMU % distance measure for a subset of our tested nor- 
mal sessions.  From the graph we can see that the major- 
ity of IFVs belonging to the tested normal sessions have a 
percentage difference from the BMU in the range between 
0 and 20%.  Some false negatives in terms of BMU dis- 
tance measure would be generated, depending on the cho- 
sen threshold for what percentage difference is classified as 
anomalous IFVs. Nevertheless if the threshold is set to 50%, 
then only a handful of IFVs are above such threshold and 
they belong to a small subset of tested sessions.  It is cor- 
rect to assume that by tweaking the SOM parameters and 
using a more precise BMU distance measure, these anoma- 
lous IFVs could be reduced even further. 
Comparing Figure 2 to Figure 3, we can clearly see that 
the BMU % distance measure for the majority of tested 
 
 
Figure 2. BMU distance - normal sessions 
 
 
 
Figure 3. BMU distance - attack sessions 
 
 
IFVs has on average increased. Also the number and spread 
of anomalous IFVs has increased and is present in all attack 
sessions. The session which produced the largest amounts 
of anomalous IFVs with a BMU distance of 50% and above 
is session 4 which is the nmap scan.  This is possibly due 
to the fact that the nmap is a separate application from the 
one which is exploited by the wuftpd exploit. Thus session 
4 produces more system calls and, as will be seen in Figure 
4, a higher TLR activation level. 
Figure 4 shows the levels of TLR activation across all 
tested sessions.   It also shows the number of suspicious 
nodes (IFVs). TLR activation is the total number of TLRs 
which have been triggered during detection but not during 
training.   An IFV can present up to 23 PAMPs, each of 
which, if presented, adds to the TLR activation level count. 
All attack sessions exhibit larger TLR activation levels in 
comparison to normal sessions. Session 4 exhibits a signif- 
icantly higher TLR activation level, possibly due to the dif- 
ferent composition of the underlying application. One could 
argue that the higher value of TLR activation for attack ses- 
sions is due to attack sessions containing larger amounts of 
IFVs. This might be the case and is currently under inves- 
tigation, however it is assumed that using a larger diversity 
of TLRs, as proposed by the creation of a taxonomy of ma- 
 
  
 
Figure 4. TLR activation level 
 
 
licious entities, and with a corresponding dataset the TLR 
activation level results will be of more representative na- 
ture. 
One could argue that the difference between the BMU 
% distance of the normal and the attack sessions is not sig- 
nificant enough on its own, however when we look at the 
TLR activation levels as shown in Figure 4, we can see that 
there is a clear distinction between normal and attack ses- 
sions.  We argue that further investigation of the SOM pa- 
rameters will produce better results, at a level comparable 
or possibly higher than existing implementations of SOM 
based IDS systems. Once we correlate the results of BMU 
% distance with the TLR activation level we have a clear 
distinction between normal sessions and sessions that ex- 
hibit malicious behaviour. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 
The  proposed  Uncertain  Risk  of  Suspicion,  Threat 
and Danger paradigm points out to the information secu- 
rity field’s tendency to increasingly incorporate, originally 
rather subjective, measures as part of security solutions. We 
suggest that the use of such measures can have a positive 
impact on the manageability of the outcome of intrusion 
detection systems, especially from an administrator’s point 
of view.  The incorporation of some of the proposed mea- 
sures in the form of biologically inspired receptors as part 
of an existing anomaly detection technique shows promis- 
ing results and points to the direction that such receptors 
might possibly be one of the missing links for successful 
anomaly detection in intrusion detection systems. Our view 
is that TLR’s inclusion not only enhances the detection ca- 
pability of anomaly detectors but also provides additional 
functionality by means of vital anomaly classification. The 
diverse nature of monitored features with the incorporated 
TLR functionality should also allow for the detection of, 
traditionally difficult to detect, attacks, such as race con- 
ditions and mimicry attacks. Further exploration of TLRs, 
their levels and their role as a classification mechanism is to 
be conducted in future research. The incorporation of fur- 
 
ther parts of the UR-STD paradigm are also to be investi- 
gated in order to exploit all the possibilities of the proposed 
paradigm. 
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